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Abstract 
 
In this paper we would to analyze the mechanism of public grants on 
economic growth. In particular this topic has been the subject of scientific 
interest by economists and, recently, also by business economics scholars. 
The studies of the economists focused on the motivations of the 
intervention itself; the business economic studies, on the other hand, 
have analyzed the impact both on the behavior of entrepreneurs and on 
the firms themselves by public grants. The studies examined so far 
highlight two basic conceptual dimensions, different, but also 
complementary to each other: on the one hand the economic-oriented to 
investigate the motivations and effectiveness of the public intervention; 
the second, business-oriented, focused on the firm’s behavior following 
public grant. Based on these arguments, our research question arises: 
could the effectiveness of public intervention for funding development 
and business innovation be influenced by the differences in the various 
socio-political and institutional contexts in which they are applied? The 
aim of paper is analyze the motivations of public grants policies and their 
influence on the behavior of firms. In this way we want to identify a 
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solutions scheme able to recover efficiency and effectiveness of public 
actions to support development. It is therefore possible to identify some 
corrective mechanisms on public intervention policies. In particular with 
reference to the behaviors induced by the grants policies, the idea is to 
re-design the grants policies in consideration of the different forms of pre 
and post contractual opportunism. With reference, instead, to the 
motivations underlying the public grants policies, it is necessary to 
examine the relationship between the State (Principal) and the 
beneficiary firms (Agent) in relation to the respective dimensions of the 
contractual force. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The study on the impact of national or extra national structural funds 
(for example, European funds) on economic growth is the subject of 
attention by scholars who have provided inconclusive results (Mohl & 
Hagen, 2009). In this way a study on public intervention policies to 
support territorial cohesion and entrepreneurial development, or more 
generally on public intervention policies for development and innovation, 
it needs to start from the logic that guided the planning from the 
extraordinary intervention for southern Italy. 
The aim of paper is analyze the motivations of public grants policies 
and their influence on the behavior of firms. In this way we want to 
identify a solutions scheme able to recover efficiency and effectiveness of 
public actions to support development. Based on these arguments, our 
research question arises: could the effectiveness of public intervention for 
funding development and business innovation be influenced by the 
differences in the various socio-political and institutional contexts in 
which they are applied? 
Through a literature review on economic and corporate thinking 
(Section 2), the authors develop some propositions (Section 3) on possible 
solutions to the governance of public grants for business development 
and innovation. In conclusion, the paper proposes a research agenda 
(Section 4) for a renewal of public grants to support  the economy as a 
strategic leverage for the development of private investments. 
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
For many years the study of public grant intervention to support the 
economic development and business innovation has been the subject of 
scientific interest by economists and, recently, also by business economic 
scholars. In particular the studies of the economists focused on the 
motivations of the intervention itself; the business economic studies, on 
the other hand, have studied the impact both on the behavior of 
entrepreneurs and on the firms themselves by public grants.1  
 
                                                          
1 Cfr. AAVV, 2018, Rapporto SVIMEZ 2018 L'economia e la società del Mezzogiorno. 
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2.1. The economic perspective 
 
Accetturo and De Blasio (2019) have highlighted the role of the economist 
trough the analysis of market imperfection. The economists identify the 
correct policies to ensure the missing public assets. In this perspective, 
already in 1961, Giannessi affirmed that the State should cover the 
specific “costs” to promote a more balanced development between 
depressed and non-depressed areas. 
In the 60’s a strong debate developed about the public grants in the 
economy; the scholars proposed, therefore, to isolate the “quid” that’s not 
a matter of the businesses (improper charges), but is related to the 
territorial deficits and therefore of the State. In particular, the lack of 
social and economic infrastructures, in the idea of Giannessi, had to be 
rebalanced by the State and not by the firms. Instead, the firms had to 
safeguard their business balance without burdening their balance sheets. 
In literature, therefore, it was stated that the charges represent the 
renunciation of firms to better alternatives. 
For this reason, these choices have been defined as improper, as 
they are expressed in additional costs, or in lost revenues, which do not 
distinguish the business logic of private companies. 
The so-called “quid” theorized by Giannessi was deepened by 
Pasquale Saraceno, who was the first economist who posed the problem 
of southern Italy between the focal points of programs and government 
action. In this regard, Saraceno argued: “(...) an economically late zone 
will never be able to start a development process, without the grants 
necessary to match the reasons for the advantage enjoyed by the more 
developed areas” (Saraceno, 1963); so that it is necessary to undertake 
special measures since, if they were not “(...) adopted to increase the 
productivity of the weakest sections of the integrated economy, the 
development of these areas will not be facilitated, indeed it will probably 
be hindered by the comparison with the <stronger economy>” (Saraceno, 
1961). 
In particular, the Saraceno’s studies contributed to the formation of 
an entrepreneurial culture in the South of Italy, the lack of which had 
hindered the spontaneous businesses start-ups. In the Centre-North of 
Italy, on the other hand, environmental conditions were more positive to 
the development of a lower entrepreneurship (Varaldo, 1995; Mariti, 
1988). 
Many scholars showed the inefficacy of public grants policies in 
Italy and in the South. In other contexts, however, the results have 
appeared more encouraging (Kline & Moretti, 2014). For instance, the 
program of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) was the most 
important program for local development in the United States. Research 
has shown industrial growth even after the end of granting programs. 
Other research shows positive effects of public policies in well-managed 
regions with an high educated workforce too; in other regions, where the 
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education level is lower and less effective quality of administration, the 
performance are very low.2 
 
2.2. The business perspective 
 
On these issues, the thought of a young Golinelli (1970) reflected on the 
validity of the public financial intervention useful for creating, over time, 
a new southern Italian entrepreneurs class. Further on, Golinelli 
affirmed the contrary declaring a "profound disappointment for the 
inability of public intervention to solve the problems of southern Italy" 
(1991, p. 62). Also Pasquale Saraceno later expressed his strong 
disappointment for “a process still far from being completed, despite the 
fact that 120 years have already passed since the political union”. 
Golinelli, like Saraceno, recognized the limits of public policy, based 
on the transfer of financial resources through subsidized financing 
scheme; they both anticipated the failure of the South politics (Golinelli, 
1980, pp. 135-138). The Saraceno and Golinelli studies improved the 
debate in micro-economic perspective; they argued the impact that policy 
grants have on the behavior of businesses and entrepreneurs. 
In this perspective, the literature studied the direct or indirect 
impact that intervention policies may have on entrepreneurial behavior; 
already in 1974, in particular, Anne Krueger argued that government 
grants to support the economy could generate undesirable effects on the 
behavior of individuals and businesses; they would encourage the 
development of phenomena of low social cohesion and entrepreneurial  
risk-averse, determining3, in fact, a deterioration of the territorial social 
capital.4  
Those findings were confirmed by a recent study carried out 
through a series of indicators related to confidence in others and the 
enlargement of cooperation. The results showed that facilitating 
transfers in support of less-developed European regions have had a 
negative effect on confidence and fairness among individuals. 
In a paper being published, Crescenzi et al., argue that the effect of 
these grants has no impact on performance indicators, such as 
                                                          
2 Becker S., Egger P., von Ehrlich, M., 2010, Going NUTS: the effects of EU Structural Funds on regional 
performance, in Journal of Public Economics, 94, n. 9-10, pp. 578-590; Becker S., Egger P., von Ehrlich, M., 
2012, Too much of a good thing? On growth effects of the EU’s regional policy, European Economic 
Review, 56, n. 4, pp. 648-668; Becker S., Egger P., von Ehrlich, M., 2013, Absorptive capacity and the 
growth effects of regional transfers: a regression discontinuity design with heterogeneous treatment effects, 
in American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 5, n. 4, 2013, pp. 29-77. 
3 Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, in American Economic Review, 64, 
n. 2, 1974, pp. 291-303. 
4 A significant function in the production of goods and services is also performed by the level of trust in the 
social system, the propensity for cooperation and collective action, and civil commitment. The literature 
defines these elements with the expression "social capital". Putnam defines social capital as "the set of trust, 
norms and networks that improve the efficiency of society" Cfr. Putnam R. (1993), Making democracy 
work: Civic tradition in modern Italy, Princeton University Press, Princeton. Fukuyama lo individua ne 
“l’insieme di norme e regole non codificate e condivise che permettono ai membri di un gruppo di cooperare 
l’uno con l’altro” Cfr. Fukuyama F., 1999, the great disruption, Simon and Schuster, New York. Nella 
sintesi dell’OCSE il capitale sociale è l’insieme di “reti associate a norme, valori e intese condivise che 
facilitano la cooperazione all’interno o tra i gruppi” (OECD, 2001).  
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investments, added value and employment. The results show that, on 
average, the program did not bring any benefits to the firms as recipient 
of state supports.  
 
2.3. Agency perspective 
 
The public grants, in some cases, have negative consequences on the 
entrepreneurs’ behavior. Part of the literature argues that “... a high 
level of public grant in the territory decrease the level of private 
investments with negative impacts on economic growth; local 
entrepreneurs could choose to take advantage of public grants without, 
however, innovate in order to survive the competitive pressures…”.5 In 
this perspective, the public grants reduce the formation of the territorial 
social capital, affecting the labor productivity and the propensity to 
entrepreneurship, as well as investments in research and development. 
In the literature there are many papers on the relationship between 
information asymmetry and opportunistic behavior. It refers to the rent-
seeking when an organization tries to generates revenues by the 
acquisition of an economic gain through the economic exploitation of the 
environment, rather than the conclusion of economic transactions and 
the production of added value. 
The phenomenon of rent-seeking was studied for the first time in 
monopolies by Tullock (1967).6 The behavior of rent-seeking is 
distinguished from profit-seeking in which the entrepreneurs aim to gain 
value through mutual benefit transactions. 
Accetturo et al. (2014)7, in assessing how the public grants favors 
the rent-seeking phenomena arise, have shown that financial transfers 
have had a negative effect on the provision of confidence and fairness 
between individuals. 
However, literature doesn’t always agree. Some authors argue 
about the usefulness and necessity of public grants for smart, inclusive 
and sustainable growth. This is the direction of Europe 2020 Strategy, 
which aims to bring all countries of Europe to a higher level of average 
spending in terms of Research and Development. 
Arrow (1962) argues that businesses left alone to invest in the 
innovation market are not always able to achieve their goals, especially 
for financial deficiencies (Lucas, 1988; Romer 1990, Barro 1991). The 
high absorption of financial resources for the design and development of 
innovation can be solved, either through create balance sheet reserves for 
the purpose default (which is possible only in excellent firms), or trough 
the provision of public funds. 
                                                          
5 Accetturo, A., & De Blasio, G. (2019). op. cit. 
6 Tullock, G. (1967). The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies, and theft. Western Economic Journal, 5(3), 
224-232.  
7 Accetturo, A., De Blasio, G., & Ricci, L. (2014). A tale of an unwanted outcome: Transfers and the local 
endowments of trust and cooperation. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 102, 74-89. 
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The studies on financial Slack8, (Renzi, 2012; Noria & Gulati, 2017; 
Orlando et al., 2016), are related to these phenomena. 
The intensity of public grants is linked to the concept of Technology 
Readiness Level (TRL), or level of Technological Maturity; this method 
allows us to evaluate the degree of maturity of a technology on the 
market. When the TRL is low, it means that the technology is far from 
the market and, therefore, the need for public grants is higher. For 
businesses, in cases where the TRL is low, in fact, it is difficult and 
dangerous to start innovation activities. 
These considerations are also confirmed in the recent paper 
presented by Angelo Castaldo at Public Administration Forum9; the 
Author supports the reasons for the intervention in support of Research 
and Development to raise the competitive capacity of firms. 
The risk and uncertainty of research projects limits the level of 
investment that is difficult to assess given the high information 
asymmetry (Akerlof, 1970) present in the relations between the actors 
responsible for granting and controlling the loan and their end users. 
Therefore it isn’t always possible to value the effectiveness and efficiency 
of the facilitation intervention, since there is a high degree of 
opportunism that could degenerate into phenomena of rent-seeking. 
Opportunism is facilitated, on the one hand, by the difficulties of 
control; on the other, from the high information asymmetry inherent in 
the evaluation processes. 
 
3. THEORETICAL SPECULATIONS AND PROPOSITIONS 
 
The studies examined so far highlight two basic conceptual dimensions, 
different, but also complementary to each other (Table 1): on the one 
hand the economic-oriented to investigate the motivations and 
effectiveness of the public intervention; the second, business-oriented, 
focused on the firm’s behavior following public grant.  
In the first dimension, the literature, which justifies the need for 
public grant due to the market's inability to make up the structural 
deficits of the context and of businesses (financial deficiencies connected 
to the nature of the interventions themselves), highlights its failed 
results. Many studies, in fact, report the presence of high socio-
institutional gaps, particularly in Italy in the depressed areas of the 
country.  
On the other hand, in relation to the corporate dimension, literature 
counteracts the logic of public grant, as it is responsible for generating 
opportunistic phenomena in firms and entrepreneurs. Opportunism, in 
                                                          
8 In management studies, the organizational slack identifies redundant resources with respect to the normal 
course of business. The surplus of resources assumes a positive value in terms, above all, of potential 
flexibility of the corporate structure with respect to the dynamism of the environmental context and to the 
innovative business processes. At the same time, the formation of slack resources implies two main negative 
effects: lower short-term economic efficiency; greater volatility in expected performance. A. Renzi, 2012. 
9 Castaldo A., Misure di sostegno alla RS&I: Le ragoni dell’intervento pubblico e metodologie di 
valutazione, Intervento Forum PA 24 Maggio 2018. 
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particular, cause the development of actions to competition and the 
innovative growth of firms, as well as the reduction of confidence levels 
among the players involved. The formation of social capital, in fact, is 
linked to the trust degree between the stakeholders of the territory. 
 
Table 1. Taxonomy of the logic behind public grants 
 
 
Exogenous vision to the firms 
(Market failure) 
Endogenous vision to the firms 
(Financial default and 
opportunism) 
Economic 
approach 
In order to achieve market failure, 
public intervention, in place of the 
enterprise, it is ineffective or 
counterproductive, when the level 
of education and administrative 
quality of public administration is 
low. 
Public grants for research and 
innovation support is motivated by the 
risk of business financial failure , but 
exposes the public administration to 
the risk of rent-seeking; this issue  
could be reduced though ex ante and 
ex post control processes reengineering 
Business 
approach 
Public grants for economic 
development, in contexts of low 
institutional quality, can lower 
the degree of trustness between 
territory’s actors; this aspect 
lowers the behavior oriented 
towards cooperation and collective 
action. 
The provision of public grants for 
economic development can generate 
opportunistic phenomena and rent--
seeking. These phenomena are more 
evident in situations of high 
information asymmetry between the 
actors of the chain: State, Persons 
responsible for administrative and 
scientific control, firms 
 
In literature, the conclusions on the ineffectiveness of public policies 
in support of development and innovation are inconclusive. While, in 
fact, in Italy and in other similar contexts such as Germany10, public 
development policies appear to be inefficient, in the United Kingdom and 
in America such policies report positive results.11 
In Italy as in Germany, for instance, the presence of a bank-based 
culture, based on the logic of the Civil Law (the property is a 
community), could affect the effectiveness of policies supporting growth 
and development given the persistence of an entrepreneurial culture, 
that is evidently not risk and market-oriented. In this perspective, more 
favorable conditions would be created for the diffusion of opportunistic 
behavior from the firms, thus inducing the arising of rent-seeking 
phenomena. 
On the contrary, in other countries as America and the United 
                                                          
10 In Germany one of the most well-known interventions is the Zonenrandgebiet, which envisaged a mix of 
tax exemptions and direct incentives for business investments. “The results show that this policy has led to a 
shift in economic activities from untreated to treated areas, with almost no overall effect. See von Ehrlich 
M., Seidel T., The persistent effects of place-based policy: evidence from the “West-German 
Zonenrandgebiet, in the American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 10, n. 4, 2018, pp. 344-374. 
11 The Regional Selective Assistance (Rsa) of the United Kingdom provides grants to firms locate in 
depressed areas; the RSA, like the 488, finances investments with the aim of increasing employment and 
investments. The performances are positive. Employment growth of 43% was recorded; the impact on the 
investments of smaller companies is also significant. Cfr. Deveraux M., Griffith R., Simpson H., 2007, Firms 
location decision, regional grants and agglomeration externalities, in Journal of Public Economics, 91, n. 3-
4, 2007, pp. 413-435; Chiara Criscuolo C., Martin R., Overman H., Van Reenen J., 2019, Some Causal 
Effects of an Industrial Policy, in American Economic Review, 109, n. 1, 2019, pp. 48-85. 
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Kingdom, where the Common Law prevails (ownership is a commodity); 
the typically liberal approach is the market-based approach inspired by 
the market for corporate control in which the efficiency of the market is 
able to redress the imbalances induced by the erroneous behavior of the 
players involved.12 
In planning of public development policies, the cultural, political 
and juridical differences of each territory should therefore be considered.  
Taking into consideration our research question it was considered 
useful to recover, on the one hand, the literature on corporate governance 
(with reference to the behavioral mechanisms of the subjects appointed 
to the governance and control of the firms); and on the other hand on the 
studies that have introduced new paradigms for an effective and efficient 
management of the public business (for example the New Public 
Management (NPM). 
It is therefore possible to identify some corrective mechanisms on 
public intervention policies. 
In particular with reference to the behaviors induced by the grants 
policies, the idea is to re-design the grants policies in consideration of the 
different forms of pre and post contractual opportunism: 
1.Control mechanisms related to post-contractual opportunism. Post-
contractual opportunism, or moral hazard, is a form of opportunism that 
induces the players to pursue their own interests at the expense of the 
other party. Part of the literature (Esposito De Falco, 1998; Eisehnardt, 
1989) argues that post contractual opportunism can be counteracted with 
control over results. Basically, using a control over results is effective 
when: the principal shows certain neutrality to the risk, or even if it is 
adverse; in situations of major conflict of purpose between the principal 
and the agent; in cases of measurable results and short-term agency 
relations. Furthermore, control over results gives importance to the 
following strategic variables: information systems and information 
acquisition costs; risk related to environmental uncertainty; high level of 
incentives. These forms of opportunism are prevalent in the bank-based 
contexts in which the market imperfections (the market is more latent), 
and the risk aversion of the agent (the entrepreneur is less risk-
oriented), requires control over the results. Therefore, intelligent 
information systems are needed that can build firms reliability grids in 
the use of public funds based on performance results. With regard to 
grants nature, the idea is to reduce, except in special circumstances, the 
subsidized grant, in favor of automatic grants such as the tax credit and 
the Patent box, which are both among the most significant measures 
introduced by the State to encourage research and development activities 
and the consequent competitive advantage of firms. 
What is shown here leads us to define the first proposition: 
P1: In bank-based systems public grants policies for economic 
development and innovation can improve situations of post-contractual 
opportunism, which must be counteracted with control mechanisms 
                                                          
12 S. Esposito De Falco, 2014. 
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based on results through the establishment of information system for 
control comparative of business performance. 
2. Control mechanisms linked to pre-contractual opportunism: pre-
contractual opportunism manifests itself in ex ante situations where the 
loan is disbursed and can generate risk of adverse selection. The most 
appropriate control is on behavior. The control strategies on the behavior 
of the agent must necessarily correlate with the construction of ex ante 
constraints that the principal can impose on the discretion of the agent. 
Therefore the behavior-based control strategy must be linked to precise 
rules and procedures. Pre-contractual opportunism manifests itself more 
easily in market-based contexts.  
In these cases, public grants policies should adopt transparent 
disclosure and compliance mechanisms, capable of reducing information 
asymmetries and opportunistic attitudes arising from the evident 
fragmentation taking place in the complex system of public funds 
assigned to research. Recent evidence, in fact, suggest the use of 
adequate codes and mechanisms able of realigning the relationships 
between principals (institutional subjects that provide benefits) and 
agents (firms that use the grants), introducing best practices and 
corporate governance systems aimed at guaranteeing appropriate 
systems to rebalance the relationships in play. The establishment of a 
self-regulatory code which, through the virtue of the comply or explain 
mechanism, allows the company to self-regulate could reduce 
opportunism, reversing the control over the individual beneficiary, who 
would be forced to declare the reasons for different behavior by the rules 
imposed. The adoption of indirect control mechanisms such as the Audit 
Certificate (through an independent Auditor) is also conceivable. The 
nature of the incentives should be indistinctly, both in the form of the 
cash contribution to the expenditure, and through forms of tax reduction. 
Based on the considerations expressed, it is proposed: 
P2: In market based systems, where coordination and control is 
entrusted to the market, public grants policies for economic development 
and innovation can arise the pre-contractual opportunism situations; 
they should be counteracted with the self-regulatory codes. 
With reference, instead, to the motivations underlying the public 
grants policies, it is necessary to examine the relationship between the 
State (Principal) and the beneficiary firms (Agent) in relation to the 
respective dimensions of the contractual force: 
3.System with high contractual strength by the Principal: in cases 
where the power of the Principal is stronger than that of the Agent, an 
unbalanced relationship is in place: the agent will try to play on 
information asymmetry, to reduce strength and the power of the 
Principal. This situation, the coordination is market-based, instead of 
hierarchy. Public policies in support of economic development must be 
based on less hierarchical and more flexible forms of coordination, so as 
to rebalance both the excessive hierarchical power of the State and the 
absence of the market. An excess of hierarchical procedures could 
compromise, in fact, the relationship already per se weighed down by the 
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excessive power of the Principal. From this point of view the 
interventions based on negotiation procedures in which the firms 
(Agents) can agree with the State (Principal) the intervention directives 
and actions appear justified. From what has been said, it follows that: 
P3: In bank based systems, since the power of the Principal is 
stronger than the Agent, the motivations underlying the public 
intervention will have to be supported by coordination mechanisms based 
on the market and on consultation center-periphery  
4.System with balanced power between Principal and Agent: in 
market-based contexts the relationship between the Principal and the 
Agent is more balanced. In such situations, in fact, where the Agent’s 
behavior is freer, the market reduces the power of the Principal. In these 
contexts forms of coordination typical of the hierarchy must monitor the 
motivations underlying the public grants.  
It is therefore necessary to plan administrative and centralized 
corrective actions, also useful for calming the market and preventing the 
excess of liberalism from leading to the creation of speculative bubbles. 
This brings us to the last proposition:  
P4: In market based systems the relationship between Principal and 
Agent is more balanced; therefore the motivations must be supported by 
coordination on the hierarchy. The hierarchy, in fact, can allow greater 
rebalancing and curb the uncontrolled development of the market itself. 
 
Table 2. Motivations and control of opportunism in public grants 
 
 
Mechanisms for coordinating the motivations behind the interventions and 
forms of regulation of opportunism 
M
a
r
k
e
t 
B
a
s
e
d
 
Prevailing coordination 
mechanisms based on the 
Hierarchy (P = A) 
Through the use of the hierarchy as a 
coordination mechanism it will be 
necessary to strengthen the role of the 
Principal. 
Prevailing opportunism: Pre-
contractual 
Control of behavior through the 
establishment of self-regulatory codes 
and audit systems based on the Audit 
Certificate. The system also includes a 
database to guide the valuator in the pre-
contractual phase. Qualitative and 
quantitative ratings on the reliability of 
firms must be provided. 
B
a
n
k
 B
a
s
e
d
 
Post-contractual prevailing 
opportunism. 
Control of results through the 
establishment of historical 
performance grids and the design of 
intelligent dynamic indicators. The 
new indicator system must be 
dynamic and flexible. 
Prevailing coordination mechanisms 
based on the Market (P> A) 
Through the use of the market as a form 
of coordination it will be necessary to 
favor the establishment of a pro-active 
dialogue between the Center and the 
Periphery 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
It is therefore necessary to change the logic of public intervention in 
operation: the contexts of reference, the characteristics of the players 
involved the dynamics in place in the State-Market-Business relations. 
The ideas proposed here consider, both the founding motivations of 
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public contributions and the consequences induced on the behavior of 
firms by public support policies. All of these factors are placed at the base 
of our propositions. 
With this work we argue that a redesign of public intervention must 
not identify specific mechanisms to control opportunism, but rather 
change the motivational logic underlying public interventions, more 
functional to the context. It is therefore possible to identify a possible, 
non-exhaustive, agenda of the actions to be taken. Our objective is to 
contribute to the development of a new model of governance of public 
grants in support of economic development and innovation: 
1. Creation of a national Authority for the introduction of a system of 
self-control of public funds for R&D: in the management of public funds 
for research and innovation, the identification of certain rules could 
reduce opportunism, overturning the control system on the individual 
beneficiary, who would be forced to declare the reasons for behavior 
different from the rules taxes.  
2. Creation of a rating agency. The objective is to create a rating 
system with specific quantitative and qualitative standards to assess: the 
reliability, timeliness, seriousness of businesses in the use and 
management of public grants for development and innovation. To date, 
there is not a system capable of controlling and memorizing the research 
and development activities proposed by businesses for the acquisition of 
subsidized funds.  
3. New performance metrics in the absence of a market. The 
perspective must be that of the business economist who must search for 
the data and adopt an adequate "research design" to evaluate the 
project’s performance. 
4. New methods of application and the operating mechanisms of 
subsidiarity. The objective is to design public grants to support the 
economy according to the impact on the territory and its players. The 
objective is to design a public grants value chain so as to identify the 
various activities, such as generator components on the one hand, and 
value destructors on the other.  
5. Design of relationships between control systems, organizational 
effectiveness, and management innovation. We need a reform in the 
formal and bureaucratic control systems that trigger defensive routines 
and revive the known vicious circles of bureaucracy; the idea is to 
program virtuous practices and innovative methods to question the 
“ritual game of control”. The idea is to use best practices to avoid the 
emergence of tunneling practices. 
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